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THE BANK'S AGENDA FOR ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT: 
Dialectics, Doubts and Dialogues
1By Reginald Herbold Green and Caroline Allison
...Fragments of our lost kingdom...
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a deadman's hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star.
T. S. Eliot, 'The Hollow Men'
We asked for bread
And they chucked a stone at us.
Senior African economic analyst 
on AD
Economic growth implies using...scarce resources more efficiently...policy 
making inevitable has to embody wider political constraints and objectives... 
the record of poor growth...suggests that inadequate attention has been given 
to policies to increase the efficiency of resource use and that action to 
correct this situation is urgently called for.
AD, p. 24
People...must be able to control their own activities within the framework of 
their communities. At present the best intentioned governments - my own 
included - too readily move from a conviction of the need for rural 
development into acting as if the people had no ideas of their own. This is 
quite wrong...people do know what their basic needs are...if they have 
sufficient freedom they can be relied upon to determine their own priorities 
for development.
- President J. K. Nyerere
What Difference Does It Make?
The 1981 appearance of the World Bank’s review of and prescription for 
Sub-Saharan Africa - Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Agenda For Action - has certainly attracted more attention, discussion and 
diatribes than any other economic study on Africa. It is perceived by 
analysts and decision takers concerned with Africa - African and external, 
friend and foe - as a critical importance even if their assessments range 
from a new source of revealed wisdom through a secular variant on the Book 
of Revelation to a recipe for accelerated starvation. Is this amount of 
attention justified and, if so, why?
The answer must be yes. AD rests on an major data collection exercise. Its 
presentation of the 1960-79 economic history of Africa - even if one doubts 
its treatment of the 1970’s as a homogenous period rather than as four quite 
divergent ones (1970-73, 197^-75, 1976-78, 1979 -) - is a serious attempt at 
description and analysis. It is based on a political economic ideology and 
model of some real analytical bite, political power and past/present 
capacity to perform for some classes in some countries at some times. It is 
therefore a significant work from an applied intellectual point of view.
Moreover, it stands - or as of 1981 stood - virtually alone. It was the
only major policy oriented analysis of Africa's economic crises and what
3might be done about them. The OAU's Lagos Plan of Action certainly 
presented longer term (and radically different) two decade strategic 
proposals but it neither addressed the immediate crises nor marshalled an 
articulated set of prescriptions nor followed an empirical approach. 
African national strategic documents are - by definition - not regional and 
rarely present overall historical and political economic perspective 
explicitly. Further, like non-official publications by African authors they
tend to be viewed as second rate or unimportant before (and often in
4substitution for) reading.
Finally, any set of World Bank proposals backed by its influence, technical
capacity, funds and influence on other analysts and sources of finance will
have a significant impact on events as well as the way in which they are
perceived. This is particularly true for Sub-Saharan Africa - the group of
countries which are economically weakest, currently most dependent on
external resource transfers, with the poorest export-import substitution-
5access to commercial finance prospects, and historically most disposed to
accept (and/or least able to reject?) external advice backed by economic
influence. Whatever academic and African official analysts think of it - 
and however cogently they criticize it - Accelerated Development is and will 
remain a substantial force for good for evil - or, more realistically, for a 
mixture of both.
In The Beginning: Genesis Of A Report
AD was born out of a 1979 request by the African Governors of the World Bank
to President McNamara for the Bank to review the causes and potential cures
of the dim eocnomic prospects which they believed confronted their
economies. Their perception - while in 1979 was by no means as stark as it
was by 1981 - is fairly well reflected in the opening of AD:^
Output per person rose more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa than in 
any other part of the world, particularly in the 1970s and it 
rose more slowly in the 1970s than in the 1960s...The tragedy of 
this slow growth in the African setting is that incomes are so 
low and access to basic services so limited...Now, against a 
backdrop of global economic recession, the outlook for all less-
developed nations - but especially for the sub-Saharan region - 
is grim.
The Report was prepared over the ensuing two years on the basis of memoranda
from a range of invited commentators, a basic consultancy draft by Eliot
7 8Berg and a series of in-house papers and review committee meetings. It
appeared in the fall of 1981 as the first comprehensive ideological and
programmatic manifesto setting out the post - McNamara Bank's response to
lagging development (in many cases disintegration) in the context of rising
global economic disorder and deepening industrial economy recession.
African Response and Some Of Its Causes
African responses to AD were initially mixed - welcoming the call for a
doubling of aid, but politely querying whether outside export advice was
always part of the solution rather than the problem; agreeing on the poor
record of the 1 9 7 0's, but wondering whether it was not both less uniformly
gloomy and more the result of external shocks than the Report presented it;
agreeing to put higher priority on production and - in particular- exports,
but expressing some scepticism about the rather simplistic market forces,
private sector, primary product led model of the Agenda. The evolution has
been toward sharper criticism - including by economists and officials who
oare both serious and moderate as well as increased opposition to Bank 
prescriptions and a sharpening of the plaint 'we are where we are because we 
did what you told us to do', most recently by the Ivory Coast, one of AD's 
models of prudent policy.
Several characteristics of AD have contributed to this response. First, its
style is ex cathedra and minatory. No signs of self-doubt by the authors as
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to the correctness of the analysis or the wisdom of prescriptons intrude on 
the reader (even when these contain apparent major internal inconsistencies 
or are not backed by the ’supporting' data tables). Further, there is a 
clear implication that the Bank will support only SSA states which act on 
its Agenda - and will seek to influence other donors to do likewise. In 
this regard AD does the Bank and its audience less than justice. In face to 
face discussion and dialogue (and internal debates) Bank personnel show far 
more uncertainty and realisation that actual decisions are complex, 
imperfect choices with no unique right answers. Furthermore, at least to 
date, the Bank has shown uneven, but real, flexibility in adapting 
programmes to actual contexts and 'pure' economic calculations to political 
economic realities. It has been, to its credit, more prone to use its 
potential for mobilizing other agencies as a carrot rather than as a stick.
Second, the Report’s analysis and prescriptions are riddled with sweeping
I]
generalisations, logical non (or non necessary) sequiturs and inconsist­
encies. This is partly the result of the normal operation of an institu-
10tional editing committee dealing with an outside consultant's draft. 
Professor Berg has a more robust and rigorous free competitive market 
allocated, comparative advantage led, neo-liberal political economic world 
view informed vision than that reflected in AD. While some changes were 
presumably softening, most seem to have been additions to safeguard certain 
existing Bank commitments (e.g. food production, manpower development, 
population planning) even where these appear to contradict the main thrust 
of the Agenda. In addition, the Bank's typical style of using general 
background analyses, broad principles perhaps derived from/supported by the 
analysis, and micro level thumbnail sketches as a means to arrive at 
concrete policy proposals, lacks any clear articulation from empirical data 
to analysis to general principles or down from them to policy proposals. 11
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Apart from the omnipresent danger of over-generalisation, this approach 
gives maximum room for backing initial premises by selective use both of 
evidence and of explanations which will ’back' the authors' preferred lines 
of action without ever subjecting them to any rigorous tests as to 
practicability or prudence.
Third, reading the Agenda is unlikely to suggest that the Bank has ever made 
mistakes other than those based on inadequate technical data inputs or 
misplaced faith in the rationality and expertise of recipient governments 
(and that, somehow, none of these errors cast any doubt on its collective 
institutional technical competence and wisdom). Yet - to cite two examples 
- in calling for highway project analysis and support to include maintenance 
costs (pp. 1 0 6, 126), and in condemning the creation of parallel, autono­
mous, expert staffed policy/implementation units ouside the domestic
decision taking structure (pp. 130, 132), the Bank is reversing its own
121970s advice with a vengeance. This is damaging in two ways: to admit and
to analyse - as well as to reverse - past mistakes is often a necessary step
in avoiding future ones; to seek to avoid all responsibility for the results
of policies and projects in which one is (and is known to be) deeply
impliciated both undermines the credibility of the new proposals and
generates animosity on the part of those who know their case histories and
thus impedes rational consideration of the new proposals. Learning and
13convincing others requires overt recognition of fallibility. Further, ex 
post criticism of decisions is not the best way to find out how and why they 
were made. This is especially true of 'good ^x ante/bad ex post' choices -
i.e. ones which during the pre 1973 or the 19 7 6 -7 8 recovery seemed to be 
sound and would have been had the 1 9 6 0's world economic trends been 
continued or restored. With much greater economic uncertainty a fact of the 
1980’s and with SSA particularly prone to damage from uncertainties because
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of its externally open economies and limited resource margins, this topic 
required specific attention it did not (and does not) receive; attention 
which might have led to more prudence and less certainty in respect to a 
number of projections and recommendations, e.g. that 1981-1985 would see a 
highly positive evolution of the terms of trade of primary agricultural 
exports.
Fourth, while certain modifications are made in the direction of human
investment and basic services (but with higher user charges and partial
privatisation) and of selective, public sector incentive focused state
intervention, the basic doctrine of the Report is that of economic (and
political) neo-liberalism. Economically it resembles both 1930’s mise en
valeur strategies and both economically and politically those of the 1 9 5 0’s
15late colonial era approaches to development. Access to basic needs,
elimination of absolute poverty and distribution are not on this Agenda. 
They are treated, at best, as optional by-products of maximizing growth by 
selective allocation of resources to areas and sectors with high short-term 
output potential and by over-riding concentration on (also short-term?) 
profitability. From this perspective, closer integration of SSA’s domestic 
economies (already among the world’s most open in terms of import to GDP 
ratios) into the world economy is seen as self evidently desirable, because 
of the poor growth prospects for the major industrial economies and for 
international trade. The assertion of AD (p. 1) that it builds on the Lagos 
Plan of Action which calls for SSA national and regional integration and for 
relatively less dependence on/vulnerability to the international economic 
environment, is (with the exception of the Report’s support - pp. 118-119 - 
for regional economic integration) not simply inaccurate, the reverse would 
be much nearer the truth.
14
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These four characteristics are not all of a kind. The first three raise 
questions as to completeness, consistence and direct applicability to 
specific cases (a doubt the Bank - e.g. pv - occasionally shares), but not 
necessarily on its overall sweep of data, analysis and conclusions. The 
fourth is rather different. Economic neo-liberalism as a credo (as opposed 
to a number of the measures contained in neo-liberal programmes) is 
contentious analytically, disputable empirically and ultimately accepted or 
rejected on normative, self interest or theological rather than pragmatic, 
public interest or programmatic grounds.^
Central Themes Behind The Agenda
Four central themes link AD's empirical.evidence, descriptive examples and 
interpretive analysis:
1. Sub-Saharan African economies performed only moderately well in the 
1960s and much less well in the 1970s. Prospects for the 1980s were 
(correctly to date) seen as even bleaker, and for the 24 low income 
countries to include falls in per capita GDP if existing trends 
continued;
2. The external economic environment surrounding SSA in the 1970s was mixed 
with some negative shock effects (e.g. drought, oil and grain price 
explosions) and some windfall gains(e.g. 1972-74 commodity and 1976-77 
beverage booms). 1980 prospects are worse;
3. Levels of overall economic growth and of export performance in SSA are 
significantly poorer than in other developing regions and worsened in 
the 1970s;
4. The economic policy and practice of SSA governments lies at the root of 
the deteriorating economic performance. In particular there have been 
biases against exports, agriculture and the public sector and in favour
of the public sector, inward looking import substitution and (albeit AD
is self contradictory on this) food.
To deny that each of these capsulized contentions contains significant 
elements of truth for the region and for most countries in it would be 
otiose. In respect to some of them AD’s ’left’ critics are almost more 
vehement than the Bank. None, however, is either as clearcut, as applicable 
to all SSA states or as clearcut as the Agenda suggests (nor, as will be 
suggested later, do they necessarily lead uniquely to the Bank’s policy 
package).
First, growth performance - while generally unimpressive except over 1976-79 
when SSA GNP growth rates were of the order of 6% and above the developing
country average - have been very diverse by country and by time. Only since
1979 have almost all economies seen stagnation/deterioration.
Second, while the need to adjust to a worsened external setting is unquest­
ionable (especially as neither AD’s optimistic terms of trade forecasts nor 
calls for doubling of aid seem particularly ’bankable’), the Report 
understates the weight of external factors in worsened performance
(especially for mineral exporters) for the period covered. Even the Bank 
17would agree that over 1 9 7 9 -8 3 external shocks have tended to overwhelm 
reform efforts.
Third, SSA 1970s growth performance is certainly unsatisfactory in absolute 
terms and below average (for the decade) regionally. However, so is that of 
’’structurally disadvantaged” (’’most severely affected", "landlocked", "least 
developed") economies in which categories SSA is disproportionately 
represented. In these classes, in fact, SSA economies have, on average,
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done somewhat better than those in other regions - at least until the 1980s.
Fourth, AD demonstrates a number of specific policy and management errors. 
This does not demonstrate how widespread or critical they were. More 
important, it does not uniquely demonstrate how or in what direction to 
change them. For example - the evidence is consistent with asserting that 
too little state intervention (on - say - Korean lines) to promote exports 
and too lax or liberal import licensing were the key external balance 
failures rather than - as AD argues - too much government intervention and 
too many barriers to imports. Similarly government expenditure levels and 
GDP growth do not - as admitted on p. 36 of the Report - correlate.
Finally, a substantial number of SSA states did adjust their policies
radically over 197^-75 and their economies did recover over 1976-79 both in
terms of growth and external balance. The general downturn dates from the
’second oil crisis’ and industrial economy depression. This record casts
doubt on any general interpretation asserting that policy weaknesses were a
primary, as opposed to a contributory, factor in all - or most - of SSA.
That is hardly surprising given the very wide diversity of actual policies
between states - a diversity AD seems to skate over except when appearing to
hold up implicit models - seemingly in particular the Ivory Coast and Malawi
which are rather unlucky choices given subsequent reinterpretation of their 
18policies following their entry into export, external balance and growth 
problems in the 1980s. As the overall GNP growth (as opposed to distrib­
ution patterns and access to public services which do vary sharply in 
relation to policies) levels do not correlate with the policy differences 
closely, either a managerial or a specific external or internal contextual 
explanatory hypothesis might seem more powerful.
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None of these criticisms alters the need for clearer priorities, more 
effective coordination, economy in the use of scarce resources and adjusting 
to a nastier world environment. It certainly does not alter the facts that 
over 1976-78 many SSA decision takers wrongly believed (along with OECD and 
the Bank) that the 1960s global economic trends had been restored and that 
over 1979-81 many (again like OECD, the Bank and the Fund) were slow to 
realize that they faced a long recession and a need to cut back and to 
redeploy quite different from 1974-75’s gap bridging by temporary austerity 
cum interim external borrowing requirements. But the criticisms do suggest 
that the basic nature of policy errors - and a fortiori of correctives - is 
not clearly nor convincingly demonstrataed in AD.
Patterns of Prescriptions
A positive forest of proposals are presented in AD. They vary widely in 
terms of generality, individual importance and their interaction with other 
proposals. Many are fairly clearly desirable on almost any criteria; others 
are either debatable generally or contextually limited in applicability.
However, a clear set of articulated priorities and a coherent presentation 
of a framework within which to organize (and achieve consistency among) 
individual proposals is harder to find. The trees do conceal the parameters 
of the forest (in some cases apparently from the authors). On the basis of 
how often and how forcefully cases are cited ten clusters appear to 
dominate.
First, there should be less (or, at the least, less expansion of) state 
activity in its traditional areas - except for economic infrastructure 
supporting the private sector. Universal free access to basic services is
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rejected as an operational goal in favour of partial privatisation and 
higher user charges for all services (the latter ironically packaged as an 
appeal to increase local community participation in decision taking!). 
Related is the second focus - curtailment of parastatal activity (especially 
in directly productive activities and the potentially profitable sub-sectors 
of commerce and transport1^). This is to be in favour of making room for 
dynamic, flexible, lightly (if not all) regulated private sector 
entrepreneurs (domestic or foreign). There is no actual proposal for 
wholesale denationalisation but the number of specific proposals for privat­
isation (e.g. seeds, drugs, basic foodstuffs, medicine) and the clear 
conviction that the private enterprise can always outcompete and outperform 
the public are close to adding up to the same thing.
Third, is greater emphasis on export expansion linked to agriculture as a 
means to raising both real peasant earnings and foreign exchange and also 
keyed to industry as a means of increasing competitive tests on efficiency 
and diversifying exports (apparently based on cheap labour more than local 
raw materials). This is not simply a pragmatic response to the appalling 
imbalances of payments (often with minimum necessary imports plus debt 
service two to three times exports) confronting a majority of SSA economies 
even in 1980 (and to confront all but a handful by 1983). Rather it is part 
of the more general fourth theme of closer integration into the world market 
on the basis of short-run comparative advantage unhampered by goverment 
restrictions or by measures designed as insurance against uncertainties 
(except forward sales and purchases to overcome price risks in respect to 
grain imports and - by extension - primary product exports).
Fifth as a necessary (in ADs view although not in pure logic) corollary to 
export enhancement, reduced emphasis on self sufficiency in manufactures and
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food (albeit AD either havers or contradicts itself on this) is urged on the
20region with the highest ratio of import to GDP growth rates (1.7) , the
lowest ratio of food production to basic nutritional requirements, and the 
greatest vulnerability to external shocks. Protection is clearly seen as 
demonstratiang inefficiency and arguments about building up acquired 
comparative advantage, ensuring against risk or using otherwise unemployed 
resources (raw materials, labour) as either petty quibbles or rational­
isations of inefficiency. To improve levels and makeup of production, the 
sixth theme calls for economic incentives - basically price incentives to 
peasant producers and private entrepreneurs mediated by unregulated markets 
and bolstered by devaluation. Non-economic incentives (including
distribution, basic services and - it would seem - real wage rates) are
specifically set aside as falling beyond the proper concern (or knowledge?) 
of development analysts. Other economic incentives - e.g. actual buyers, 
inputs, goods to buy, transport in the case of peasants - are mentioned but 
in a way, and with a lack of stress or articulation, which suggests they are 
either very much secondary to prices or are not analysable at regional
versus at national or sub-national levels.
The need for more middle and high level trained personnel to provide greater 
'technical expertise' is at the core of the seventh area of stress. 
Somewhat oddly given the calls for government spending cuts so is more 
primary (but not adult) education. Knowledge creation is the eighth area of 
emphasis. Data and analysis (e.g. applied research, statistics, financial 
reports) are seen as a sine qua non for better management and improved 
policy decisions. Further they are presented - albeit with no evident
articulation or resource priority even, or especially, in the crucial 
agricultural sector - as needed to make available simple, cost reducing, 
output potential enhancing technical breakthroughs.
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A ninth heavy stress is on setting priorities, articulating policies and 
programmes from them in a consistent manner, coordinating implementation, 
building in review and actually allocating resources in accordance with 
clear and articulated priorities. Ironically, AD itself does not rate very 
high on these tests.
Finally, the necessity of enhanced donor support and involvement in design­
ing/controlling policy design and resource use receives an entire chapter 
plus repeated references elsewhere. Concessional finance quality should be 
raised by greater flexibility and programme - vs project - orientation. De 
factor or de jure donor/SSA recipent compacts like Fund stabilisation and 
Bank structural adjustment programmes should be used to enforce policy 
change by conditionality. The Bank should, preferably, coordinate flows to 
individual countries and ensure that sizeable ones go only to those SSA
states accepting the AD Agenda. ,\
Agenda acceptance is not seen in terms of acceptance (often merited) or
21rejection (also often merited) of the specific proposals. Rather it 
hinges on acceptance of the main themes and clusters. This is a logical 
view - if AD’s analytical themes and policy cluster stresses are correct, 
most of the specifics follow. If, however, they are seriously flawed, the 
Agenda requires basic revision before appropriate, articulated, consistent 
national strategies and priorities can be constructed even if many 
components, taken separately, are valid.
First, it is clear that most SSA states must live more frugally. However, 
with basic functions (including maintenance) at dangerously low levels, a 
strong case exists for higher taxes more effectively collected and better 
use of revenue rather than straight output cuts. The bland abstraction from
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distribution from saying who would provide what services to whom and from
22the human cost of cuts already made is breathtaking. The same general 
criticism applies to the second cluster relating to public enterprises whose 
performance is far more varied than AD suggests and is by no means uniformly 
poorer than that of private enterprises even in pre tax profit terms. Nor 
can one simply ignore (as AD does) that often the only alternative is 
private foreign enterprise whose availability, effectiveness and accept­
ability cannot be generalized. The reduced rates posited for some public 
enterprises - buyers, sellers, transporters of last resort and guarantors of 
interyear food reserves - would, by definition, guarantee that they made 
losses while private enterprises choosing the profitable business made 
losses, presumably allowing AD Mark II once again to criticize their 
"inefficiency" (defined as enterprise profits).
The third cluster - priority to raising exports - is valid. Many African
23countries lack coherent, articulated export strategies and several of
24those which exist seem to require review as no longer viable. The problem
is how? AD’s targets are not attainable on present or identifiable future 
25export mixes. Country specific export rehabilitation, pre-export
processing, natural resource linked manufacturing and new resource based 
exports may afford answers - a general invocation of high growth of the 
present low elasticity, poor global demand growth primary products and 
neo-NICery is doomed. In any event, the fourth theme of greater external 
integration (at least globally - AD does not really pursue the regional 
alternative) via free trade/unhampered comparative advantage is not a 
necessary consequence of agreement that more exports are a top priority. 
Historically, escape from low level, free trading dependence has usually 
involvled selective partial withdrawal from the world economy and state 
intervention to promote exports based on different, acquired (developed)
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comparative advantage - e.g. Imperial Germany, France, Italy, Japan, South 
Korea.
Given the poor export prospects for the 1980's; the historic record of new
export bases - especially in manufacturing (e.g. Brazil) as cited in 
? fiWDR 82 ) - being built up behind protective barriers; the stultifying
effect of the present incremental import to GDP ratio and the present levels
of global excess capacity, deprotection seems likely to release resources
primarily to unemployment and.reduced emphasis on food production to be an
agenda for accelerated starvation. If so the fifth cluster on generalized
reduction of internal orientation of SSA economies (as opposed to more
selective choices of instruments and projects) is plain wrong, indeed
wrongheaded. There are many inefficiencies and rationalisations of unsound
open or concealed subsidies (including in respect to the private foreign
sector, e.g. domestic market textiles in Kenya and export oriented ones in
the Ivory Coast) which are not cost efficient in terms of risk avoidance or
building future efficient, nationally integrated economies. These should be
reduced (preferably rooted out), but their existence does not render 
27Brazilian, South Korean or Japanese experience irrelevant. Nor does it 
reverse the fact that import liberalisation and attempts to alter industry 
and agriculture toward global competitiveness (as advised by the Bank) 
tripled Mexico’s ratio of imports to GDP, sharply increased food deficits 
and played a central (not the sole) role in causing the present crisis. 
More incentives - as stressed in the sixth cluster - are needed to raise 
production (of products with plausible domestic or export market prospects). 
Whether - especially in the conditions of massive imperfections, severe 
crisis and generalized (private and public) restrictive practices pertaining 
in SSA - the free market can provide production efficient incentives without 
state market management intervention is a very different question - and one
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to which few analysts, businessmen or consumers would give an unqualified 
yes. The exclusion of many apparently relevant incentives - e.g. access to 
health and education, programmes to reduce time spent gathering fuel and 
water - suggests tunnel vision (and little examination of peasant and worker 
stated preferences and priorities).
The seventh and eighth areas of stress are clearly correct. The problems 
arise at micro proposal level where ill thought out ideas and gaps can be 
discerned. Middle level personpower - usually scarcer than high level in 
SSA - is not treated systematically nor is the accounting cadre (surely an 
enterprise or departmental management efficiency sine qua non) cited as a 
special priority.
The ninth cluster stressing the need for clearer strategic priorities backed 
by resource allocations and consistently articulated to policies, programmes 
and projects is a crucial one - whatever agenda any African state adopts. 
To plan is to choose and so is to manage. The fact that similar criticisms 
could be made of most capitalist and socialist states (and of the Bank) does 
not alter this fact albeit it may temper expectations of how much can be 
achieved how fast.
In respect to the final external cooperation cluster, differentiation is 
needed. The case for flexible, programme oriented aid (made at least 
equally cogently by several SSA states and by UNCTAD well before AD) is both 
compelling and one on which progress is possible. The doubling of real 
concessional finance flows to Africa over the 1980s, however desirable, is 
most unlikely to happen and most irresponsible to project in determining 
available resources and possible growth rates.
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The proposal for greater donor policy involvement would be valid if donors 
would recognize their own past mistakes (and be less dogmatic now) and 
engage in dialogue with African recipients. Those characteristics are not 
evident in AD. Views on reorganizing bilateral and other multinational aid 
around a core of conditional Bank/Fund programmes will hinge largely on 
readers’ assessment of the accuracy, practicability, political viability and 
human desirability of their overlapping worldviews. However, even 
supporters of those worldviews may doubt whether the Bank’s apparent 
aspiration to become SSAs (and the Third World’s) planning ministry and 
Platonic Guardian cadre (an aspiration it had at least since 1970 but seems 
to see as more fully realizeable as its clients became more desperate to 
secure foreign finance) is in either the Bank's or SSA's best interests.
Some Sectoral Glimpses
To review AD fully sector by sector would not be practicable in a single
29paper - a volume is the minimum appropriate length. However it is
possible to make certain comments.
In the first place most of the sectoral analysis and proposals do relate to
one or more of the main clusters outlined above and so are subject to the
same queries - or defensible on the same logic. For example the public
expenditure prooposals rest on an unsubstantiated hypothesis that African
state spending is higher than and different in kind from that in other
economies and that viable alternatives to public enterprises are generally
available. The available evidence strongly suggests the opposite for SSA as
. 30a region and most states taken separately.
The export targets appear, on disaggregation to be patently unattainable or
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undesirable. In the case of agricultural products they would trigger 
price collapses reducing earnings. In that of manufactures they are either 
premature - if one views the Brazilian and Korean pattern of several decades 
of protected home market oriented pre-export development as relevant - or 
plain surreal - if the implicit model is Hong Kong or Singapore with 
.plentiful infrastructure, established business communities, capital 
surpluses and no rural hinterlands.
The agricultural sector analysis, projections and proposals are particularly
32critical and, arguably, open to particularly heavy criticism. While they 
manage to list almost every measure anybody could suggest they do not set 
priorities, establish a selection/coherence framework, take the existing 
state of knowledge much further forward nor show any historical perspective 
as to the past failures or side effects of a number of the proposals 
(including cases which the Bank must know because it advocated, financed and 
- negatively - evaluated them). In respect to food/industrial-export crop 
priorities the chapter is incoherent or contradictory presumably because the 
sections arguing that food has been overpromoted and that food self 
sufficiency is a priority needing higher resource allocations and more price 
incentives flow from different hands. Arguably the very heavy concentration 
on grower prices (at times apparently nominal rather than real) distracts 
from less costly, more practicable changes in improving access to buyers, 
speed of payment, availability of inputs and of consumer goods which would 
be more cost efficient in respect to short run production raising. Its 
ignoring the incentive impact of health, education, water access and fuel 
supply runs against the Bank’s own experience as well as against what 
African peasants say and do.
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Finally, it grossly understates the significance of the fact that in field
tested, economically viable peasant practicable rural technological
improvements (in seed, fertilizer, small scale irrigation, etc) Africa has
perhaps a tenth as large a stock as South and Southeast Asia and a much less
adequate structure to raise the flow at all levels from local through
national and sub-regional to international crops research institutes’
programmatic priorities. This is a particularly unfortunate lapse because
the Bank is in a position to provide and mobilize resources (financial,
personnel, knowledge, institutions) in this sub-sector. The sums required
are manageable, comparative experience is critical, because returns are
uncertain in amount and not immediate SSA states (and most bilateral donors)
are likely to underinvest during a crisis - a set of factors creating a
33context in which Bank leadership would be particularly appropriate.
Universal Access to Basic Services, Women and Distribution: Off the Agenda?
qiiWomenJ appear in AD largely as a byproduct of its inclusion of reducing 
population growth as a crucial long term goal. While the simplistic 
neo-Malthusian tone of the presentation will grate on many readers, the 
argument that a 2 . 5  to 4 per cent annual increase in population would raise 
employment generation, infrastructure and basic service resource 
requirements beyond levels available from any likely growth rate is valid. 
It is, in fact, accepted by at least most SSA governments.
What is less clear is the analysis of, or proposals for, achieving 
demographic transition. Apparently AD views this as a suitable area for 
state intervention until the process of ’modernisation’ itself takes over 
since the ’market’ for birth control, unlike others, is perceived by AD as
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imperfect and needing state management! The Report fails to address the 
historic evidence that a decline in the birth rate (and with a lag in 
population growth) usually follows a fall in death rates (especially infant 
mortality) which is itself usually related to more assured - economically as 
well as physically - food supplies, access to pure water and to education 
for the absolutely poor, less favoured (in ecology or location) regions and 
women. The whole thrust of raising fees for basic services (and reducing 
growth of supply), privatisation and concentrating incentives on better 
prices to more efficient (defined as more modern and larger scale) peasants 
and enterprises hardly seems well attuned to achieving these normal 
preconditions for demographic transition.
As is standard in works of economic analysis - even, or perhaps especially, 
when they seek to articulate development targets and policies - women are 
semi-invisible and fragmented in AD. For example the facts that a high per 
cent of rural households are headed by women; that these appear to have 
disproportionately low access to inputs and extension advice; and that over 
half of agricultural labour time (with different tasks apparently gender 
specific) are not mentioned in the agricultural section and therefore lead 
to no policy proposals. That appears to fly in the face of any common sense 
approach to identifying and removing constraints on production (let alone on 
absolute poverty reduction which used to be a central Bank goal). True it 
is a mistake most SSA governments make but that is precisely why the AD 
Report should have highlighted it and called it to their attention.
Women have not totally disappeared in AD. The education of women (hardly 
furthered one might suppose by higher fees which have in the past 
disproportionately reduced female enrolment ratios) is recognised as a means 
to reduce population growth and (quite how is unclear) to lessening the
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burden (on time not on peoople) of household work such as food processing, 
fuel gathering and watering collection. The latter is seen as critical to 
raising agricultural productivity by 'freeing* time for work in the field - 
a point which oddly does not appear in the chapter on agriculture but in the 
section on population.
These fragmentary references are unrelated to - arguably conflict with - the 
main body of argument. Overall the low priority attached to basic services, 
expansion linked to proposals to raise charges for those which exist, run 
directly contrary to facilitating (creating effective incentives for) the 
contributions to development expected of women. There is no serious
analysis of the specific roles women play in economic (directly productive 
and supporting) structures in Africa. This is especially serious in respect 
to agriculture where the vision of the smallholding household as 'African 
economic man' is simplistic (if better than its predecessor as 'African
traditional, irrational man' against which AD still has to contend). Quite 
apart from its reductionist economy mysticism it excludes women. Even a 
coherent presentation of 'African economic woman' in the Report would have 
been highly welcome, and potentially highly productive, on analytical and 
operational as well as normative grounds precisely because so little 
attention has been devoted to the topic in official analysis and policy 
making.
The Agenda does not overtly discuss distribution - a telling shift from a 
decade of stress on "absolute poverty eradication" and "redistribution with 
growth". It is basically concerned only with short term production 
increases (which no one would deny are a priority), overlooking the fact
that - especially in poor countries - who produces how determines who gets
how much why. Participation in production is the only safe base for
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participation in distribution and decision taking.
While the AD Report does not discuss distribution, its Agenda has an 
implicit philosophy about it. That outlook is not "trickle down" but 
"trickle up":
a. resources are to go to ecologically and infrastructurally favoured zones 
and to progressive (read richer) peasants;
b. basic services are to be de-emphasized - certainly not pushed toward 
univeral access;
c. remaining services are to be on a fee basis - limiting them to the 
favoured peasant sub-group;
d. real wages and informal sector incomes for those spending largely on 
food are to be reduced with the greatest impact on low wage/informal 
sector people;
e. the service cuts and selection principle for peasants to back jWill3I! „intensify excess labour burdens and differential lack of access for
women as household heads, producers, mothers, bearers of wood and water.
35This _is "redistribution with growth" revisited - and reversed.
Whether this approach is consistent with development depends on ones 
definiton. For the majority of the people of SSA over the short run (and in 
the not very long run the poor of Africa are dead and Keynes* dictum against 
ignoring short run costs applies forcibly) clearly no. That poses 
problems as to whether the Agenda is consistent with medium and long term 
growth enchancement. First, throwing away the bulk of Africa's plentiful 
resource, rural labour, may not be efficient. Second, lack of access to 
basic services will worsen mental and physical capacity of many workers. 
Third, African states do not have the force to operate productionist police 
states.
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Excluding peasants who are in ecologically unfavoured or low infrastructure 
zones and lowering poor urban real income levels is hardly consistent with 
maxiumum growth in food production or sales. Rural hunger in Africa is 
largely in poor peasant households and can only be met by making it possible 
for them to produce more. Urban food demand (at prices encouraging 
production) will be compressed by cutting real incomes of the poor.^ A 
much more serious, complex and specific context centred approach is needed 
to work out production/distribution policies to cut food imports, reduce 
incidence of severe malnutrition and of hunger and build up markets for 
foods.
Concentration on larger, better off, best land peasants may not maximise
production even in the short run. Kenya and Malawi evidence suggests that
peasants are more scarce resource efficient producers on average and for
most crops than large farmers or plantations. It does not show that among
peasants larger ones are more efficient - if anything au contraire. One
exception is marginal/sub-marginal rainfall zones for which substantial
resource allocation can be justified only on the principle that human lives 
39matter. Therefore, even on short term production boosting grounds which 
AD’s peasant focus upholds, its "neo-kulak” preference is empirically 
dubious. The same type of argument applies in respect to women, e.g. if 
there has been discriminatory lack of access for women farmers to inputs, 
advice, marketing, etc. then enchanced access should have high incremental 
production pay-off.
Somewhat analagous questions arise in respect to urban workers, whether in 
the modern or informal sectors, employed or self employed. AD’s whole
thrust is toward lower real wages to increase competitiveness. If informal
-25-
sector incomes largley depend on wage earner's purchase and tend to be 
related to (on average substantially lower than) modern sector wages - as 
appears to be the case - this is certainly a prescription for greater 
inequality and more absolute poverty. Even brief contact with the rapidly 
growing exurbs of - e.g. - Nairobi, Kinshasa, Lagos, Accra, Addis Ababa and 
Dakar makes that a humanly chilling prospect. More to the point of AD's 
concerns it is not self evidently efficient in production terms. Workers 
without access to basic education, health services, pure water and income to 
meet their household's basic needs are not very productive because they are 
often sick and hungry, have inadequate knowledge to acquire skills easily 
and are denied economic incentives (such as being able to feed, clothe and 
house their families decently). Further, one of Africa's more plentiful 
resources is labour. Investing so as to increase employment and product­
ivity would, therefore, seem likely to be efficient resource allocation from 
a production viewpoint even if it did require market intervention other than 
worker income reduction. AD simply overlooks the problem and therefore 
proposes no answers to an admittedly difficult question but one with which 
the ILO, to its credit, has been wrestling for at least a decade.
Accelerated Disintegration - The Agenda Revisited
Since 1981 the economic situation in SSA has deteriorated dramatically as
40have perceptions about its probable future trajectory. The 1983 WDR's
41middle projection for low income SSA over 1985-95 is approximate matching 
of population and GDP growth rates, following a 1979-85 per capita fall of 
the order of 20Í if 19 7 9 -8 1 terms of trade losses are taken into account. 
That projection assumes sustained moderate to high growth of OECD economies, 
no increase in their new protectionism, enhanced investment in Africa half 
financed out of increased net aid and commercial borrowing flows. The
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assumptions look - at best - on the optimistic side of realism, the outturn 
is grim.
42As a recent Bank evaluation of progress in SSA reveals this result and 
these projections are not for any general lack of attempts to consolidate 
and to adjust. On the one hand terms of trade shifts, external resource 
flow contractions, drought and war/economic destabilisation (especially in 
respect to states unfortunate enough to be South Africa's neighbours) have 
often overwhelmed positive national initiatives. On the other, the short 
term costs of adjustment are usually high and early while the gains are 
gradual and later; thus additional resources are necessary to alleviate 
early costs if the changes are to be seen as politically feasible or to 
survive if adopted.
In fact the Bank - never unanimously in support of AD - has resiled from a
number of its key positions. How fully, how fair and why is obscured by the
fact that the Bank rarely (except in its internal memoranda and published
evaluations of individual projects) admits to error. However, the list is 
43impressive:
1. major sustained terms of trade improvement of African exports is not in 
sight and generalized increases in growth rates for tropical agricult­
ural exports would be counterproductive;
2 . efficient import substitution is a real category and is of comparable 
importance - at least in the medium run - to export expansion. Basic 
food self sufficiency and enhanced domestic energy are generally 
applicable goals as is a greater range of basic (e.g. broad market 
consumer goods, construction materials). ECA’s statement "Unless sound 
and efficient import-substitution policies are implemented and exports 
diversified in terms both of products and markets, the projected
historie growth of GDP might not materialize” is now cited by the Bank 
45with approval;
’price distortion’ has been introduced as an index of policy effic­
iency^ - an approach somewhat more objective and less ideological than 
AD’s strictures on public sector efficiency. There are problems with 
this approach of three types: a.) targeted incentives usually involve 
price distortion as does almost any attempt to alter existing income 
distributions, b.) the judgements on how much distortion is present are 
basically subjective (and look very odd in some cases - e.g. Malawi and 
Kenya appear much too low), c.) the correlation between price distortion 
and growth while positive is not high - other factors appear to have 
been more critical in at lease some cases. However, the concept is more 
subject to refinement and to application of constraints than the looser 
intervention/public sector denigration of AD;
better public sector management has become one of the Bank's key
operational target - for government and enterprises - and one it is
47trying to articulate. While WDR 83 is very uneven and breaks less new 
ground than it supposes it at least centres squarely on the selectivity 
and goal efficiency focus of AD dropping its, partly implicit but 
unmistakeable parallel theme, of "the less public sector activity the 
better”;
the priority to applied and tested agricultural research appears to be 
in the process of significant upgrading;
some concern is again expressed on distribution issues both in terms of 
political sustainability/human desirability and of production incentives 
and results;
at least orally - in some negotiations and public discussions, as well 
as in private, the Bank’s staff are much readier than AD was to admit 
they do not know all the answers nor suppose that the same specific
44
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answers can apply equally (or in some cases at all) to each of its 40 
odd SSA members.
That is a not insignificant set of changes. Unfortunately it leaves the AD 
strategy and Agenda seriously undermined without providing a coherent 
alternative or set of alternatives. Further, it has been reflected only 
partially and unevenly in Bank relations with SSA members. Some (not all) 
negotiations still seem based on the premise that AD is absolute revealed 
wisdom.
Efforts toward alternative construction lie outside the scope of this paper
but have begun to appear from several sources: northern applied academic
(often linked to advice to aid agencies)1^ , African continental bodies^0 and
51African non-governmental organisations and scholars. These accept AD’s 
premises that structural transformation - following initial consolidation - 
is needed and that achieving it requires both austerity and clear priorities 
in resource use. They are - fairly uniformly - critical of AD's emphases on 
primary export led growth, unleashing the private sector (as opposed to 
providing more incentives and less purposeless regulation) and reducing 
(rather than prioretizing and restructuring) the role of the state and of 
state owned enterprises. In particular they seek to look more closely at 
particular national contexts clearly believing that direct application of 
regional general principles to specific cases without thorough selection and 
adaptation will chop societies and economies to fit an externally designed 
and warped procrustean bed.
A Conclusion Advocating More Dialogue
The preceeding assessment of Accelerated Development - and particularly of
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its Agenda - may seem highly critical. It is meant to be. The Report’s 
political economic worldview is incomplete, contentious, flawed and - in 
places - internally contradictory. Therefore, it is not - as the preceeding 
section suggests the Bank might now tacitly agree - a complete or safe guide 
to action. Further, the Report’s overly self confident style and tendency 
to instruct (or hector), rather than inform or advise Africans and African 
leaders appears radically inconsistent with its own endorsement of 
participation, with the reality that only Africans are primarily concerned 
with the well being of Africa and with the brutal fact that outsiders can 
walk away from the results of wrong decisions (including those taken on 
their advice) while Africans have to live with them. They have the right to 
take basic decisions about their own destiny and only they can implement any 
agenda no matter how strong its internal logic or the external pressures for 
its verbal acceptance.
However, AD cannot be written off either as trivial or as totally wrong. It 
has begun to concentrate attention - both in SSA and more generally - on the 
need to concentrate attention on strategic reformulation. Steady as you go 
is hardly an adequate navigational policy on a ship demonstrably in danger 
of sinking; more of the same seems a counsel of despair given the actual 
results of 19 7 9 -8 0 (both as to attempted accelerated growth on the same 
lines and in respect of orthodox retrenchment on those advocated by the 
IMF). Further, as cited above, a number of elements in its analysis and 
apparent priority lists and many of its specific proposals are both valid 
and applicable in at least many SSA countries. To deny this and to seek to 
return to the strategies and policies of 19 7 6 -7 9 (however appropriate some 
of them may have been then or however necessary retention of some strands in 
them may be now) would be even more rigidly ideological, pedantic, captious 
or blind than the most egregious elements in the Report.
* *• -30-
The pressing need is for further data creation and collection, more analysis 
and fuller dialogue on what the strategic, programme, policy and project 
implications of that data and analysis are. The marginal utility of more 
general critiques of AD - except for new, and especially new African, 
audiences - is probably declining rapidly. What remains critical is to 
select what is valuable from it and to reconstruct with additonal elements 
to create coherent, viable, economically practicable and humanly acceptable 
strategies - policies - programmes - projects for specific SSA countries for 
particular time periods (beginning with the present, not starting after 
consolidatiori is assumed to have been achieved). It should be stressed that 
for both normative and operational reasons that is a task which must be 
carried out primarily by Africans in Africa. The problem to date is not so 
much that there is absolutely too much outside contribution (albeit the tone 
of some of it is open to grave objections) but that there is too little 
African or genuinely joint African/outsider contribution. Ultimately that 
is a weakness only Africans can remedy but more serious attention to their 
work, cooperation with their efforts (including finance for research and 
conferences) and full acceptance that well meaning academic and internat­
ional agency paternalism or would be Platonic Guardianship is as normatively 
indefensible and ultimately damaging to both sides as any other form of 
colonialism or neo-colonialism are contributions which they can expect.
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Notes
1. Reg Green is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development 
Studies (Sussex) as well as a part time consultant to the government of 
Tanzania, the World Council of Churches, SWAPO, the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference and various international agencies 
and a Trustee of the International Center for Law in Development. The 
analysis and views of this paper, however, are his personal respons­
ibility and are not necessarily those of Tanzania, SADCC, etc. Caroline 
Allison is a Research Officer at IDS. She has co-edited the IDS 
Bulletin on Accelerated Development and written on issues relating to 
the interaction of women and development in SSA and on the position and 
struggles toward liberation of Namibian women.
2. World Bank, 1981.
3. OAU, 1981.
4. African critics - with an uncomfortable degree of accuracy - say they 
are viewed with reservation both globally and in Africa because they are 
African. Whether this is a variant of ’if you are so smart why aren’t 
you rich’ is based on cultural or racial prejudice or/and is simply 
because Africans (including African writers and their work) are - like 
women - so often ’invisible’ to many analysts and administrators is less 
clear but the results are almost equally unsatisfactory whatever the 
cause.
5. See Bank, 1983 esp. p.38; ACMS/UNCTAD 1984.
6. op cit, pp.3 ,4.
7» Professor Berg has distinct and growing reservations about the final 
version of his draft.
8. A process which is not in itself at all unusual for international agency 
reports nor about which (as opposed to what changes were made at whose 
instigation) the Bank makes any secret.
9. As illustrated by the opening quotation and by P. Ndegwa's paper 
"Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review Article" in 
Ndegwa, Mureithi and Green forthcoming.
10. One co-author has experienced this process from both sides - in academia 
and government and as a consultant to international agencies. It has 
its virtues in reaching agreed action programmes but substantial costs 
so far as rigour of analysis, clarity of priorities and internal 
consistency are concerned.
11. This is to a degree inevitable in attempting to work from concrete 
analysis to organising principles and back to concrete proposals for a 
large number of cases within severe space and time constraints. In AD 
it is exacerbated by the Bank’s apparent desire to avoid any serious 
analysis of the nature of the very distinct political, social and
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economic divergences among African states. This is understandable and 
by leaving the political and the contextual out of political economy in 
a way Smith, Ricardo and Mill would have found just as unsatisfactory as 
Marx and Engels.
12. One co-author has been in several country negotiations with the Bank on 
precisely these issues. Indeed on one occasion he was - wrongly he now 
believes - a supporter of its proposal to create a de facto parallel 
administration.
13. This is not to say that the Bank was either alone, careless or ill 
intentioned. One co-author must acknowledge having supported advice 
from the Bank he now perceives as erroneous while in Tanzania (e.g. 
early 1 9 7 0’s cuts in grower prices for maize, selecting tea and tobacco 
as ’growth pole' crops). Nor is it to argue that the Bank necessarily 
has a worse track record than other sources of external advice. 
However, it has been influential and in a number of cases instrumental 
in securing the adoption of policies, creation of institutions and 
implementaion of projects now severely and rightly criticized.
14. See ACMS/UNCTAD, 1984, Section B-1 for fuller elaboration.
15. See e.g. Z. A. and J. M. Konczacki, 1977 and E. A. G. Robinson, 1965.
16. This is true of any broad political economic perspective and of 
strategies derived from them. The same point could be made about 
Marxian, pragmatic welfare capitalist (e.g. Keynesian or Brandtian) and 
neo-social democratic (e.g. basic needs) perspectives, albeit in these 
the public interest (or externalities surrounding self interest) and 
distribution have greater weight than in neo-liberalism.
17. Bank, 1983a.
18. For an independent analysis of Malawi see C. Harvey, "The Case of 
Malawi" in Allison and Green, 1983»
19. To define only inherently loss making functions as appropriate for 
private enterprise creates logical problems for using profitability as a 
test of their efficiency.
20. Bank, 1983» loc cit.
21. This is hardly a severe criticism - any list of 500 specific proposals 
(including any by the present authors) will contain some which are not 
fully thought out, subject to negative side effects, impracticable, 
eccentric and/or plain dotty.
22. See UNICEF 1983 and "Sub-Saharan Africa in Depression: The Impact on the 
Welfare of Children" by R. H. Green and H. W. Singer in World 
Development, March 1984.
23. An extreme, but not unique example, is Tanzania which had fairly clear 
sectoral priorities and strategies in most sectors from 1969 on but none 
in respect of exports until 1981. Before then there were a clutter of
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micro initiatives, projections seeking to estimate (not manage or alter) 
future export earnings and isolated statements neither welded into a 
coherent, articulated strategy nor receiving serious political backing. 
This contrasts oddly with very different approaches to import management 
and foreign exchange budgeting/allocation - a contrast much more widely 
perceptable than simply in Tanzania.
24. e.g. Ivory Coast whose export volume has stagnated since 1979 and Malawi 
whose plantation bias centred strategy is literally starved of resources 
to the verge of bankruptcy.
25. See M. Godfrey, "Export orientation and structural adjustment in 
sub-Saharan Africa” in Allison and Green, 1983, in respect of 
manufacturing.
26. World Bank, 1982, p.29c
27. World Bank, 1983, p.69 praises Brazil for having provided uncoordinated 
special incentives to enterprises in response to their pressures and 
influence within a broad import substitution and subsequently export 
promotion strategy for manufacturing.
28. This is often disguised by the fact that senior personnel have to do 
their own middle level work (or fail to function because it is not done) 
which gives the first impression that the gap is at or near the top, 
rather than in the middle of the continuum from unskilled worker to 
senior manager.
29. See, e.g. Allison and Green, 0£ cit.
30. See C. Colclough, "Are African governments as unproductive as the 
Accelerated Development Report implies?” in ibid.
31. See M. Godfrey, 0£ cit.
32. See R. H. Green, 1984.
33. See Lipton, 1983, for a fuller exposition albeit in this article he is 
urging EEC action because of its focus on EEC/ACP Convention issues.
34. See Allison "What Alternatives for Women in Africa" in Ndegwa, Mureithi 
and Green forthcoming, for a fuller discussion of AD’s implications for 
women.
35. In fairness, it seems unlikely that ADs, final editorial group ever
explicitly worked out their document’s implicit distribution strategy.
36. "this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long 
run we are all dead." (A Tract on Monetary Reform, MacMillan, London, 
p.65.) This is a general criticism of all "turnpike" and Mahalanobis
models pushed to long term growth maximisation conclusions.
37. See I. Livingstone, "Choices for Rural and Urban Development" in Ndegwa, 
Mureithi and Green forthcoming, for a fuller exposition with special
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reference to Malawi.
38. See de Gaspar et al, 1982, for a much fuller exposition.
39* See Livingstone, o£ cit.
40. See J. Carlsson, 1983-
41. op cit, pp.57-63.
42. Bank, 1983a.
43. ibid; K. Y. Amoako and S. Please, 1983; Bank 1982 and 1983 passim as 
well as conversations with Bank personnel provide the basis for this 
list.
44. ECA, 1983.
45. In Bank 1983a.
46. WDR 83 (Bank 83), PP.57-63.
47. ibid, Part II, "Management in Development".
48. This comment is based on direct experience and on discussions with 
African officials by one of the co-authors.
49. e.g. Allison and Green, o£ cit; Carlsson, ££ cit.
50. e.g. ECA, 1983 and the 1983 Tunis Seminar of the African Centre for 
Monetary Studies on External Debt a majority of the papers for which and 
all but a handful of the participants in which were African.
51. e.g. Ndegwa, Mureithi and Green which flows from a Kenya Chapter of the 
Society for International Development March 1983 Conference, also with 
an African majority of papers and participants.
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